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Abstract
In case of multiple source lending even solvent firms may be forced into
bankruptcy due to uncoordinated credit withdrawals of their lenders.
This paper analyzes whether a debtor firm can thwart such inefficient
liquidations by offering creditors the option to delay their foreclosure de-
cision rather than obliging them to simultaneous actions as suggested by
Morris and Shin (2004). With this option, lenders can endogenously
determine the timing of their credit decisions, trading off the informa-
tional benefit from waiting against the associated cost of delay. Our
results state that the option to delay diminishes creditor coordination
failure whenever the firm is expected to be in distress.
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11 Introduction
Particularly in Europe, the business sector is characterized by a large number of
small and medium-sized firms, which typically resort to bank debt financing when
procuring capital for their investment projects. Since these firms are usually fi-
nanced by a multitude of bank lenders, it is hard to overstate the importance of
creditor coordination failure.1 Banks may decide to foreclose their loans because
they fear that others will also withdraw, even though it would be in their collective
interest to roll over the credit. Such uncoordinated withdrawals of bank loans can
lead to inefficient project liquidations, forcing even economically solvent firms into
bankruptcy.
Despite its considerable relevance, the problem of inefficient creditor coordination
has received scant attention in the previous economic literature, since traditional
coordination games produced multiple equilibria. Only recently, the risk of creditor
coordination failure has been analyzed more elaborately, building on the theory of
global games. Global games, introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and generalized by Morris and Shin (2003) and Frankel et al. (2003), as-
sume that each player noisily observes the game’s payoff structure, which itself is
determined by a random draw from a given class of games. Under certain conditions,
these assumptions induce a unique equilibrium, so that the incidence of inefficient
project liquidations arising from the coordination problem among lenders can be
quantified.
The concept of global games has first been applied to credit markets by Hubert
and Scha¨fer (2002) and Morris and Shin (2004). They analyze coordination
failure among a continuum of homogeneous creditors in a static model, where all
lenders have to decide simultaneously at an interim stage of the debtor firm’s invest-
ment project whether to foreclose or to roll over their loans. Credit decisions are
made based on imperfect information regarding a fundamental state, which can be
interpreted as a measure of project quality, and even economically sound projects
may be doomed to failure if too many creditors foreclose. In this context, Morris
and Shin (2004) and Bannier and Heinemann (2002) propose that the firm
can mitigate the risk of inefficient project liquidations by adjusting the degree of
information dissemination. Other studies do not focus on information policy as an
instrument of creditor coordination, but analyze to what extent a debtor firm can
avoid coordination failure by choosing a heterogeneous creditor structure. These
1 See Detragiache et al. (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2001) for empirical evidence on
the prevalence of multiple bank lending in European countries.
2models assume that over time the firm has established close business relations to
a particular bank which is therefore willing to finance a sizeable fraction of the
firm’s project. Takeda (2003) shows that the incidence of inefficient project liq-
uidations is reduced if such a relationship bank jointly finances the firm’s project
with a continuum of small ”arm’s length” banks. Schu¨le and Stadler (2005)
demonstrate that creditor coordination may be even more efficient if the relation-
ship bank is able to signal its credit decision to the small lenders, and Elsas et
al. (2004) endogenously determine the relationship bank’s optimal proportion of
total firm debt. Combining both perceptions regarding a debtor firm’s capability to
diminish creditor coordination failure, information policy and relationship lending,
Bannier (2006) analyzes the firm’s optimal information dissemination strategy in
a model with multiple heterogeneous bank lenders. However, at least in some situa-
tions it seems questionable whether a debtor firm can actually resort to information
policy and borrowing from a relationship bank in order to mitigate the risk of inef-
ficient project liquidations. First, it is doubtful that the firm virtually can control
the precision of lenders’ private information and thus the extent of uncoordinated
credit terminations. Second, especially young and small firms often do not dispose
of long-term relations to a particular bank, so that they have to rely exclusively on
arm’s length debt financing.
This paper introduces a new aspect to the debate on applicable instruments of cred-
itor coordination, as it deals with the question whether a debtor firm can reduce the
incidence of coordination failure by offering creditors an alternative debt contract.
As a benchmark, we analyze the static global game of Morris and Shin (2004),
who assume that the financing is undertaken via a standard debt contract, obliging
all lenders to simultaneous credit decisions at an interim stage of the firm’s invest-
ment project. We then consider the effects of providing creditors with the option
to defer their roll over or foreclosure decision. We refer to such a contract as a
leniency debt contract and examine whether granting the option to delay can serve
as an instrument to coordinate lenders more efficiently compared to the benchmark
case of standard debt contracting a` la Morris and Shin (2004). Provided with a
leniency debt contract, waiting rather than withdrawing the credit early generates
an informational benefit via social learning. Lenders who delay their credit deci-
sion are able to observe how many creditors have stopped lending before and use
this additional information to update their prior beliefs regarding the quality of the
firm’s project. However, making a better informed decision late in the game may
be associated with a cost of delay since foreclosing late rather than early yields a
lower payoff. Thus, lenders provided with a leniency debt contract endogenously
determine the timing of their credit decisions, trading off the informational benefit
from social learning against the expected cost of delay.
3Methodically, our dynamic creditor coordination game with endogenous timing of
credit decisions and costs of delay is an application of the global game framework
analyzed by Dasgupta (2006).2 He considers a continuum of players with the op-
tion to delay investment in a risky project. Investing late rather than early reduces
a player’s uncertainty regarding the project quality, but involves a cost of delay
by generating a lower payoff if the project succeeds. Hence, our model is different
from Dasgupta (2006) insofar as we assume that the risky action (to roll over) is
reversible, while the safe action (to foreclose) is irreversible. Furthermore, our ap-
plication to creditor coordination requires that deferring the safe action to withdraw
the credit is associated with a cost of delay, whereas in Dasgupta (2006) delaying
the risky action (to invest) is costly.
These modifications of the payoff structure affect our qualitative results in a limiting
case where the incidence of creditor coordination failure can be derived explicitly. As
the investment project’s level of risk approaches infinity, the extent of coordination
failure remains unaltered in our dynamic creditor coordination game compared to the
benchmark model of Morris and Shin (2004), while efficiency increases with the
option to delay in Dasgupta’s investment game. Away from the limit, for the more
relevant case of substantial but finite levels of project risk, it essentially depends
on the commonly expected quality of the investment project whether a debtor firm
benefits from providing its lenders with a leniency debt contract. Our numerical
calculations imply that offering a standard debt contract a` la Morris and Shin
(2004) is optimal if the expected project quality is sufficiently high. In contrast, for
sufficiently low values of expected project quality, the incidence of inefficient project
liquidations can be mitigated by granting lenders the option to delay their credit
decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
introducing the timing of events and the information available at all stages in the
static benchmark game and in the dynamic game with the option to delay. In
Section 3 we briefly discuss the incidence of coordination failure when creditors
are provided with a standard debt contract. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium
of the dynamic creditor coordination game, when creditors obtain a leniency debt
contract. Comparing the risk of inefficient project liquidations in both games, we
provide implications on the optimal debt contract in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Alternative global games with endogenous timing of actions and learning have been analyzed by
Heidhues and Melissas (2003), Xue (2003), and Brindisi (2005).
42 The model
The model considers a simple economy consisting of a debtor firm and a continuum
of ex ante identical, risk neutral arm’s length lenders. Resorting to debt financing
from the continuum of creditors, the firm decides to set up a risky investment project
which matures in period T . Whether the project succeeds and loans can be repaid
at maturity decisively depends on a fundamental state θ ∈ R, to which we refer as
project quality, and on the credit decisions of lenders. Each creditor finances a loan
which is secured on collateral and has a face value normalized to 1. Provided with a
standard debt contract, creditors have the option to foreclose their loans prematurely
in period t1 < T and seize the collateral κ1 ∈ (0, 1). Alternatively, the debtor firm
can offer a leniency debt contract, granting the option to delay credit decisions.
Then, lenders may withdraw their credit either in t1 or in a later period t2 ∈ (t1, T ),
if they are willing to foreclose at all. As foreclosing a loan in t2 merely generates a
payoff of κ2 ∈ (0, κ1), protracting the decision to stop lending is associated with a
cost of delay.3
Whether a lender decides to withdraw his credit prematurely or to roll over is de-
termined by his expectations of the project quality θ, which is drawn from the
commonly known distribution N(µ, 1
a
) and is not revealed until the project matures
in period T . In addition to the expected project quality µ ∈ R and the project’s
level of risk 1
a
∈ R+, every creditor i observes a noisy private signal xi regarding θ
previous to his credit decision in t1:
xi = θ +
εi√
b
, (1)
where εi is a random variable distributed i.i.d. N(0, 1) and independent of θ and
b > 0 is a scale factor reflecting the precision of xi| θ. Provided with the option to
delay, lenders who have rolled over their loans in t1 receive an additional private
signal yi before making their final credit decision in period t2:
yi = Φ
−1(1− `1) + ηi√
c
, (2)
where c > 0 is a constant and the idiosyncratic random variable ηi ∼ N(0, 1) is
i.i.d. across creditors and independent of εi. As `1 denotes the fraction of creditors
who decided to withdraw their credit in t1, the signal yi can be interpreted as a
noisy statistic based on the proportion of ”active lenders”.4 Hence, exercising the
3 Note that all payoffs are stated in expected terminal wealth, so that discounting does not com-
plicate our analysis. Hence, the restriction κ2 < κ1 is equivalent to the assumption that creditors
discount and receive a constant payoff at the time they withdraw their credit.
5option to delay generates an informational benefit which has to be balanced with
the potentially incorporated costs of delaying the foreclosure decision.
By assumption, lenders withdrawing their loans prematurely cause disruption to the
debtor firm’s investment project, such that the project is doomed to failure whenever
` > θ, where ` ∈ [0, 1] denotes the total mass of foreclosing creditors. In this case,
the firm is forced into bankruptcy, implying that the loans of creditors who have
rolled over cannot be refunded. In contrast, if the project succeeds (` ≤ θ), the
firm remains in operation and is able to repay all loans at full face value. Thus, a
creditor’s payoff from extending his credit until maturity in period T is given by
u(θ, `) =
1 if θ ≥ `0 if θ < `.
Clearly, the unconstrained efficient outcome of this creditor coordination game would
have all lenders withdrawing their credit in t1 whenever θ < 0 and not at all other-
wise, independent of the debt contract offered by the firm. However, with imperfect
information on θ creditors cannot coordinate on this efficient equilibrium, so that
even economically sound projects with θ ≥ 0 may be liquidated. Below, we examine
whether the debtor firm can mitigate the risk of such inefficient project liquidations
by offering lenders a leniency debt contract with the option to delay rather than a
standard debt contract as proposed by Morris and Shin (2004).
3 The standard debt contract with simultaneous
credit decisions
To set a benchmark, we first discuss the static creditor coordination game in which
the debtor firm offers a standard debt contract, obliging all lenders to simultaneous
credit decisions in period t1. Morris and Shin (2004) show that this global game
has a unique equilibrium, provided that the firm’s investment project is sufficiently
risky relative to the precision of creditors’ private information. The equilibrium
is then characterized by trigger strategies, such that each lender rolls over his loan
4 We assume that creditors observe the statistic yi with some idiosyncratic noise in order to ensure
the existence of a unique equilibrium. However, when determining the incidence of creditor
coordination failure, we focus on the case of perfect observation of the past (c → ∞) as is
common in the literature on herds and cascades (see e.g. Bikhchandani et al. (1992)). In
this limit, the monotone transformation of `1, Φ−1(1−`1), is equivalent to observing `1 and thus
without loss of generality.
6whenever he obtains a private signal xi greater than a trigger value x
∗ and withdraws
credit otherwise. Since private signals are correlated with θ, this implies that the
project fails whenever a quality lower than the fundamental threshold θ∗ is realized.
As a necessary condition for an equilibrium in trigger strategies, the marginal cred-
itor who receives the critical signal x∗ must be indifferent between foreclosing his
loan in t1 and rolling over, i.e.
κ1 = Pr(θ ≥ θ∗|x∗).
Since the posterior beliefs of a lender i who has observed the realization of the private
signal xi are given by
θ|xi ∼ N
(
aµ+ bxi
a+ b
,
1
a+ b
)
, (3)
the indifference condition for the marginal creditor can be rewritten as
x∗ =
a+ b
b
θ∗ − a
b
µ+
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1(κ1). (4)
The second condition necessary to derive the equilibrium thresholds x∗ and θ∗ reflects
that the investment project is at the margin of success and failure at the state θ for
which θ = `. Due to the assumed independence of private signals and the continuum
of creditors, the mass of foreclosing lenders ` is equivalent to the probability that an
individual lender withdraws his credit, i.e.
` = Pr(xi < x
∗|θ) = Φ
(√
b(x∗ − θ)
)
.
Thus, the critical project quality θ∗ is implicitly given by the critical mass condition
θ∗ = Φ
(√
b(x∗ − θ∗)
)
. (5)
Finally, substituting the creditors’ cutoff condition (4) into the critical mass condi-
tion (5) delivers an equation purely in terms of θ∗:
θ∗ = Φ
(
a√
b
(θ∗ − µ) +
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1(κ1)
)
. (6)
As a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium, consider that the ex-
pression on the right-hand side of equation (6) must have a slope of less than 1
everywhere. Deriving the right-hand side with respect to θ∗, it can easily be seen
that a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium is a <
√
2pib. Hence, as long
as the creditors’ prior information regarding the project quality θ is sufficiently dif-
fuse relative to their private signals xi, equation (6) delivers a unique θ
∗ ∈ (0, 1),
quantifying the risk of inefficient project liquidations by the set of states θ ∈ [0, θ∗).
74 The leniency debt contract with the option to
delay credit decisions
We now augment the static creditor coordination game of Morris and Shin (2004)
as analyzed above to examine how efficiency is affected if creditors are provided with
a leniency debt contract, granting each lender the option to delay his credit decision.
The information system of this dynamic game, given by (1) and (2), implies that
deferring the credit decision rather than withdrawing the credit in period t1 generates
an informational benefit which may offset the costs associated with delaying the
foreclosure decision. As a creditor i who waits until t2 observes a private signal yi in
addition to his first period signal xi, the information held by this creditor in t2 can
be specified by a sufficient statistic si(xi, yi). We can thus look for equilibria where
lenders act according to trigger strategies around thresholds (x∗D, s
∗
D), such that:
• A creditor i forecloses his loan in t1 if and only if xi < x∗D. Otherwise he
chooses to wait.
• A creditor i who has exercised the option to delay forecloses his loan in t2 if
and only if si < s
∗
D.
Assuming such trigger strategies, the proportion of creditors who withdraw their
credit in period t1 at any state θ is given by
`1 = Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ) = Φ
(√
b(x∗D − θ)
)
.
Substituting `1 into equation (2) demonstrates that the second period signal yi
actually provides a lender i with additional information regarding the unknown
project quality θ:
yi =
√
b (θ − x∗D) +
ηi√
c
.
Note that in equilibrium observing yi is equivalent to observing an exogenous signal
zi =
yi√
b
+ x∗D, where zi can be rewritten as
zi = θ +
ηi√
bc
.
Since zi|θ is distributed N(θ, 1bc), applying Bayes’ Rule to update the creditors’
previous beliefs θ|xi as given by (3) delivers
θ|xi, zi ∼ N
(
aµ+ bxi + bczi
a+ b+ bc
,
1
a+ b+ bc
)
.
8Finally, resubstituting zi =
yi√
b
+ x∗D, we get
θ|xi, yi ≡ θ|si ∼ N
(
si,
1
a+ b+ bc
)
, (7)
where
si =
aµ+ bxi +
√
bcyi + bcx
∗
D
a+ b+ bc
denotes the sufficient statistic for (xi, yi).
Having derived the posterior beliefs of creditors who exercise their option to delay,
we are now in a position to establish necessary conditions for an equilibrium in
trigger strategies. If lenders follow trigger strategies as outlined above, the total
mass of creditors who foreclose their loans prematurely at any fundamental state θ
is given by Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ) +Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ). Thus, the debtor firm’s project
succeeds if and only if
θ ≥ Pr(xi < x∗D|θ) + Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ).
However, since the decisions of a creditor to withdraw his credit or to roll over in
the two periods are not independent in the dynamic game with the option to delay,
it is not apparent that there exists a critical θ∗D above which the investment project
succeeds and below which it fails. Lemma 1 verifies that such a threshold θ∗D really
exists.
Lemma 1. Define
G(θ) = Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ) + Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ)− θ.
Then, G(θ) is strictly decreasing and crosses zero exactly once.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Lemma 1, we can express the critical mass condition of the dynamic creditor
coordination game as
θ∗D = Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ∗D) + Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ∗D). (8)
The cutoff condition for creditors considering to exercise their option to delay in t1
states that lenders trade off the proceeds from foreclosing early against the expected
benefit of waiting and then acting optimally:
κ1 = Pr(si < s
∗
D|x∗D)κ2 + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D, si ≥ s∗D|x∗D). (9)
9Finally, the marginal creditor who has rolled over his loan in t1 must be indifferent
between withdrawing his credit in period t2 and continuing lending until the project
matures:
κ2 = Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D|s∗D).
Using (7), this cutoff condition for lenders in t2 can be rewritten as
s∗D = θ
∗
D +
Φ−1(κ2)√
a+ b+ bc
. (10)
As a first step to solve the system of equations (8) - (10), note that substituting the
threshold s∗D as given by (10) into the critical mass condition (8) yields an equation
merely in x∗D and θ
∗
D:
θ∗D = Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ∗D) + Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < θ∗D +M |θ∗D),
where M = Φ
−1(κ2)√
a+b+bc
. Lemma 2 states that as long as the debtor firm’s investment
project is sufficiently risky, this equation implicitly defines θ∗D as a smooth increasing
function of x∗D with a bounded derivative.
Lemma 2. Assume a <
√
2pib(1+c)
1+
√
1+c
. Then, for any x∗D, there is a unique θˆ(x
∗
D), such
that G(θˆ, x∗D) = 0, where
G(θ, x∗D) = Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ) + Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < θ∗D +M |θ)− θ.
Moreover, dθˆ
dx∗D
∈ (0, b
a+b
)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using Lemma 2 and equation (10), the cutoff condition (9) of creditors in period t1
can be expressed purely in terms of x∗D:
κ1 = Pr(si < θ
∗
D(x
∗
D) +M |x∗D)κ2 + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D(x∗D), si ≥ θ∗D(x∗D) +M |x∗D).
As we show in the Appendix, this equation has a unique solution, provided that
a <
√
2pib(1+c)
1+
√
1+c
. By means of Lemma 2, this implies that there also exists a unique
solution (x∗D, s
∗
D, θ
∗
D) to the system (8) - (10). We can thus state:
Proposition 1. When creditors act according to trigger strategies, the dynamic
game with the option to delay credit decisions has a unique equilibrium provided that
a <
√
2pib(1+c)
1+
√
1+c
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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While this uniqueness result holds for general values of c, we have to focus on the
limiting case when creditors in t2 observe the fraction of active lenders with vanishing
noise (c → ∞) in order to identify the incidence of inefficient project liquidations.
In this limit, lenders who exercise their option to delay the credit decision essentially
face no uncertainty regarding the project quality θ in period t2. The critical mass
condition (8) then reduces to
1− θ∗D = (1− κ2) Φ
(√
b(θ∗D − x∗D)
)
, (11)
whereas equation (9) can be rewritten as5
1− κ1 = (1− κ2) Φ
(√
a+ b
(
θ∗D −
aµ+ bx∗D
a+ b
))
. (12)
Rearranging (12),
x∗D =
a+ b
b
θ∗D −
a
b
µ+
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1
(
κ1 − κ2
1− κ2
)
, (13)
and substituting into equation (11), the critical project quality θ∗D is implicitly given
by
1− θ∗D = (1− κ2) Φ
(√
a+ b
b
Φ−1
(
1− κ1
1− κ2
)
− a√
b
(θ∗D − µ)
)
. (14)
Similar to the benchmark static game, in case of leniency debt contracting the
risk of inefficient project liquidations is specified by the interval θ ∈ [0, θ∗D), where
θ∗D ∈ (0, 1).
5 Implications on the optimal debt contract
Having derived implicit solutions for the equilibrium project quality thresholds θ∗
and θ∗D, we analyze in this section what kind of debt contract the debtor firm should
offer in order to mitigate creditor coordination failure. As mentioned above, the in-
cidence of inefficient project liquidations is given by the intervals [0, θ∗) and [0, θ∗D),
respectively. Offering a leniency debt contract with the option to delay credit deci-
sions instead of a standard debt contract a` la Morris and Shin (2004) therefore
reduces the risk of uncoordinated credit withdrawals if and only if θ∗D < θ
∗.
5 See the Appendix for a formal derivation of the equations (11) and (12).
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5.1 Comparison of coordination failure in the limit as a→ 0
Both, the static creditor coordination game and the dynamic game with the option to
delay required that the debtor firm’s investment project is sufficiently risky in order
to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium. We now focus on the extreme case where
the project’s level of risk approaches infinity (a→ 0), so that the prior distribution
θ ∼ N(µ, 1
a
) converges to an improper uniform prior over the real line. This property
allows for a characterization of the thresholds θ∗ and θ∗D of the respective games in
closed form.
Provided with a standard debt contract, uncoordinated credit withdrawals of lenders
lead to a failure point θ∗ as implicitly defined by equation (6). In the limit as a→ 0,
the right-hand side of this equation simplifies to Φ(Φ−1(κ1)), implying that
θ∗ = κ1.
If the firm offers a leniency debt contract instead, the critical state θ∗D at which the
project is at the margin of failure and success is implicitly given by equation (14),
which reduces to
θ∗D = κ1
in the limit as a → 0. Hence, whenever the investment project conducted by the
debtor firm is arbitrarily risky, the incidence of inefficient project liquidations is
determined by θ ∈ [0, κ1) in the static benchmark game as well as in our dynamic
creditor coordination game, and thus independent of the debt contract offered by
the firm.
Let us examine this limiting result in more detail by providing some insight into the
decision strategies of creditors in the static game and in the dynamic game with the
option to delay, respectively. If lenders are provided with a standard debt contract
and thus simultaneously decide on rolling over or foreclosing their loans, we know
from equation (4) that
x∗ =
a+ b
b
θ∗ − a
b
µ+
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1(κ1).
Clearly, a higher expected project quality µ shifts the trigger signal x∗ to the left
as it increases the lenders’ incentives to extend their credit. Considering the critical
signal x∗D of the dynamic game as given by equation (13),
x∗D =
a+ b
b
θ∗D −
a
b
µ+
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1
(
κ1 − κ2
1− κ2
)
,
12
it is easy to see that the same intuition applies to the credit decisions of lenders in
period t1 if they are provided with a leniency debt contract. In contrast, creditors
who exercise their option to delay and additionally observe the second period signal
yi essentially face no uncertainty regarding the project quality θ in the limit as
c → ∞, and thus follow strategies independent of the prior mean µ. Hence, for a
finite level of project risk 1/a, the strategies of all lenders in the static game are
affected by the ex ante expected project quality µ, whereas some creditors provided
with a leniency debt contract follow mean independent strategies. However, as
a → 0, the strategies of all creditors are mean independent in both games, finally
implying that the risk of inefficient project liquidations does not depend on the debt
contract offered by the firm.
In order to illustrate how mean independence induces an identical risk of inefficient
project liquidations in both games, let us compare the mass of lenders withdrawing
their credit prematurely at the critical state θ∗ in the static game with the mass of
foreclosing creditors at the critical state θ∗D in the dynamic game. First consider the
case of standard debt contracting, obliging lenders to simultaneous credit decisions
in period t1. Using the definition of the trigger signal x
∗ as given by (4), the mass
of creditors who decide to foreclose their loans can be expressed as
Pr(xi < x
∗|θ∗) = Φ
(
a√
b
(θ∗ − µ) +
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1(κ1)
)
. (15)
Similarly, using equation (13), the mass of lenders who withdraw their credit in
period t1 in the dynamic game with the option to delay is given by
Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ∗D) = Φ
(
a√
b
(θ∗D − µ) +
√
a+ b
b
Φ−1
(
κ1 − κ2
1− κ2
))
. (16)
On the one hand, we expect this mass to be lower than the mass of creditors fore-
closing in t1 in the static game since creditors provided with a leniency debt contract
have another opportunity to foreclose their loans in t2 and seize the collateral κ2.
On the other hand, in case of leniency debt contracting a creditor mass of
Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ∗D) = Pr(xi ≥ x∗D|θ∗D)κ2, (17)
exercises its option to delay and stops lending in period t2, thus causing additional
disruption to the debtor firm’s project.6 Whether the total mass of foreclosing
lenders at the critical state in the dynamic game, given by the sum of (16) and
6 The decomposition of the product term arises because as c→∞, Cov(xi, si|θ)→ 0, since si → θ.
See section A.4 of the Appendix for a formal derivation of equation (17).
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(17), exceeds the total mass of foreclosing lenders at the critical state of the static
game, given by (15), obviously depends on the parameters of the prior distribution
θ ∼ N(µ, 1
a
).
However, in the limit as a→ 0 the decision strategies of all creditors are independent
of the prior mean µ, so that the total mass of lenders who withdraw their credit
merely depends on the payoffs of the respective games. Considering the benchmark
static game, equation (15) reduces to
lim
a→0
Pr(xi < x
∗|θ∗) = κ1,
whereas the mass of creditors who do not exercise their option to delay in the
dynamic game is given by
lim
a→0
Pr(xi < x
∗
D|θ∗D) =
κ1 − κ2
1− κ2 .
Thus, the debtor firm ”gains” a creditor mass of
κ1 − κ1 − κ2
1− κ2 =
1− κ1
1− κ2 κ2
in period t1 by offering a leniency debt contract instead of a standard debt contract.
However, as a→ 0, equation (17) becomes
lim
a→0
Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ∗D) =
(
1− κ1 − κ2
1− κ2
)
κ2 =
1− κ1
1− κ2 κ2,
implying that the benefits from offering a leniency debt contract in t1 are just bal-
anced by the loss of creditors in period t2. It is no coincidence then, that the
thresholds θ∗ and θ∗D of the respective games coincide when lenders follow mean in-
dependent strategies due to diffuse prior information regarding the project quality θ.
5.2 Comparison of coordination failure away from the limit
While the result of debtor firms not being able to affect the incidence of creditor
coordination failure by debt contracting in the limit as a→ 0 is rather discontenting,
the above discussion indicates that offering a leniency debt contract instead of a
standard debt contract a` la Morris and Shin (2004) may well have an effect
for the more relevant case of substantial but finite levels of project risk (a 9 0).
Using numerical methods, we thus examine to what extent the incidence of inefficient
project liquidations is influenced by a decreasing level of project risk in the static as
well as in the dynamic creditor coordination game. For all numerical calculations, let
κ1 = 0.5 and κ2 = 0.3, implying that the lenders’ cost of delay, given by k ≡ κ1−κ2,
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amounts to 0.2.7 As the idea of debtor firms being able to control for the precision
of creditors’ private signals xi is indeed precarious and our results rather depend on
the ratio of a to b than on the absolute values of these precisions, we fix b = 1 while
varying the prior precision a in the range where the uniqueness of equilibrium can
be guaranteed: a ∈ (0,√2pi).
Figures 1 and 2 depict the results for low (µ = −0.5) and high (µ = 1.5) expected
project qualities, whereby our choice of means is determined by their distance from
the crucial region of θ, θ ∈ (0, 1).
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Both figures approve our result that in the limit as a → 0, the risk of inefficient
project liquidations is given by θ ∈ [0, κ1), independent of the debt contract offered
by the firm. However, as the project’s level of risk 1/a decreases, creditors in period
t1 put more weight on their prior information regarding θ relative to the information
contained in their private signals xi. For high values of the expected project quality
(Figure 1), this implies that all lenders in the static benchmark game become more
optimistic as a increases, leading to a declining mass of foreclosing creditors and thus
to a decrease in θ∗. The same intuition applies to the decision strategies of lenders
in the first period of the dynamic game. But provided with a leniency debt contract,
creditors who exercise their option to delay follow mean independent strategies in t2
and thus are less optimistic, causing more disruption to the firm’s investment project
overall (θ∗D > θ
∗). Hence, a firm conducting a project with high expected quality µ
benefits from offering a standard debt contract instead of a leniency debt contract
with the option to defer credit decisions, independent of the cost of delay and the
project’s level of risk. In contrast, similar arguments imply that granting creditors
the option to delay rather than providing them with a standard debt contract is
beneficial whenever the debtor firm has access only to projects with sufficiently low
7 We have checked many different values of κ1 ∈ (0, 1) and k ∈ (0, κ1), but did not find evidence
that our results are affected qualitatively by varying costs of delay and collateral values.
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expected quality (Figure 2). In this case, a declining level of project risk 1/a fosters
the pessimism of creditors acting in period t1 of the static benchmark game and
therewith leads to an increase of θ∗. Whereas this intuition also applies to lenders in
t1 in the dynamic game, the strategies of creditor who choose to protract their credit
decision are independent of the low prior mean µ, thus less pessimistic, implying that
overall less creditors withdraw their loans if they are provided with a leniency debt
contract (θ∗D < θ
∗).
For an intermediate value of expected project quality (µ = 0.6), lying inside the cru-
cial region θ ∈ (0, 1) where uncoordinated credit withdrawals may lead to inefficient
project liquidations, Figure 3 illustrates that the effect of the prior mean µ may
be not dominant, so that the firm’s choice of the optimal debt contract becomes a
nontrivial decision.
Figure 3:
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a new aspect to the debate on how debtor firms can mit-
igate the risk of inefficient project liquidations arising due to uncoordinated credit
withdrawals of their lenders. Adopting a dynamic global game as analyzed by Das-
gupta (2006), it examines whether a firm can diminish creditor coordination fail-
ure by granting its lenders the option to delay their roll over or foreclosure decisions
rather than obliging them to simultaneous credit decisions as suggested by Mor-
ris and Shin (2004). In this respect, our analysis of efficient debt contracting
complements the previous literature which exclusively concentrates on the firm’s in-
formation policy and the possibility of relationship lending as applicable instruments
of creditor coordination.
Our model implies that creditors endogenously determine the timing of their credit
decisions, trading off the benefits from waiting and gathering more accurate infor-
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mation against the potentially incorporated cost of delaying the foreclosure decision,
whenever the debtor firm offers a leniency debt contract with the option to delay.
Comparing this dynamic creditor coordination game to the static benchmark game
of Morris and Shin (2004) who assume financing via a standard debt contract,
binding creditors to simultaneous roll over or foreclosure decisions, enabled us to
provide implications on the firm’s choice of the optimal debt contract.
In the limit when the investment project conducted by the debtor firm is arbitrarily
risky, so that the equilibrium of the model can be analyzed in closed form, our
results state that the risk of inefficient project liquidations remains unaffected of the
debt contract offered by the firm. In contrast, resorting to numerical calculations
for the more relevant case of substantial but finite levels of project risk, we have
demonstrated that in general granting lenders the option to delay does exert decisive
influence on their ability to coordinate credit decisions. Whenever the expected
quality of the firm’s investment project is sufficiently sound, providing lenders with
an option to delay is detrimental for efficient creditor coordination, implying that
the firm should adhere to a standard debt contract a` la Morris and Shin (2004).
However, when the debtor firm is expected to be severely in distress, it can reduce the
incidence of uncoordinated credit withdrawals by offering its lenders a leniency debt
contract with the option to delay credit decisions. Hence, just in those situations in
which the issue of creditor coordination failure becomes most prominent our paper
suggests an alternative way to mitigate the risk of inefficient project liquidations,
complementing the commonly discussed instruments in terms of information policy
and relationship lending.
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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Using equation (1) and rewriting (2) as yi =
√
b(θ− x∗) + ηi√
c
, the sufficient statistic
si =
aµ+bxi+
√
bcyi+bcx
∗
D
a+b+bc
can be expressed as si =
aµ
a+b+bc
+ b(1+c)
a+b+bc
θ +
√
bc
a+b+bc
γ, where
γ = εi√
c
+ ηi. Then, si < s
∗
D is equivalent to γ <
a+b+bc√
bc
s∗D− aµ√bc −
b(1+c)√
bc
θ and we can
rewrite:
G(θ) = Φ(A(θ)) +
∫ ∞
A(θ)
∫ B(θ)
−∞
f(ε, γ)dγdε− θ,
where A(θ) =
√
b(x∗D−θ) and B(θ) = a+b+bc√bc s∗D−
aµ√
bc
− b(1+c)√
bc
θ. Using Leibnitz’ rule,
differentiation under the double integral delivers
G′(θ) = A′(θ)φ(A(θ))− A′(θ)
∫ B(θ)
−∞
f(A(θ), γ)dγ +B′(θ)
∫ ∞
A(θ)
f(ε, B(θ))dε− 1.
Denoting by φ(·) the standard normal PDF of ε, and by φˆ(·) the (non-standard)
normal PDF of γ, we can express the joint densities as
f(ε = A(θ), γ) = φ(a(θ))f(γ|ε = A(θ))
f(ε, γ = B(θ)) = φˆ(B(θ))f(ε|γ = B(θ)).
Since A′(θ) = −√b and B′(θ) = − b(1+c)√
bc
, we can now rewrite G′(θ) as
−
√
b φ(A(θ))
[
1−
∫ B(θ)
−∞
f(γ|ε = A(θ))dγ
]
− b(1 + c)√
bc
φˆ(B(θ))
∫ ∞
A(θ)
f(ε|γ = B(θ))dε−1.
Clearly, G′(θ) < 0. Furthermore, limθ→−∞G(θ) = ∞ and limθ→∞G(θ) = −∞,
which completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
As above, the sufficient statistic si can be rewritten as si =
aµ
a+b+bc
+ b(1+c)
a+b+bc
θˆ+
√
bc
a+b+bc
γ,
where γ = εi√
c
+ηi. Writing s
∗
D = θˆ+M , si < s
∗ implies that γ < a√
bc
(θˆ−µ)+a+b+bc√
bc
M .
Define
B(θˆ) =
a√
bc
(θˆ − µ) + a+ b+ bc√
bc
M.
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Since B′(θˆ) = a√
bc
, using the proof of Lemma 1 gives us
∂G(θˆ, x∗D)
∂θˆ
=−
√
bφ(A(θˆ, x∗D))
[
1−
∫ B(θˆ)
−∞
f(γ|ε = A(θˆ, x∗D))dγ
]
+
a√
bc
φˆ(B(θˆ))
∫ ∞
A(θˆ,x∗D)
f(ε|γ = B(θˆ))dε− 1.
Now define
P1 =
∫ ∞
B(θˆ)
f(γ|ε = A(θˆ, x∗D))dγ
P2 =
∫ ∞
A(θˆ,x∗D)
f(ε|γ = B(θˆ))dε.
Note that P2 < 1 and φˆ(·) <
√
c√
2pi
√
1+c
, since the variance of γ amounts to 1+c
c
. Thus,
a <
√
2pib(1 + c) is a sufficient condition for
∂G(θˆ,x∗D)
∂θˆ
< 0. In contrast,
∂G(θˆ, x∗D)
∂x∗D
=
√
bφ(A(θˆ, x∗D))P1 > 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem,
dθˆ(x∗D)
dx∗D
= −
∂G(θˆ,x∗D)
∂x∗D
∂G(θˆ,x∗D)
∂θˆ
,
defining Q =
∂G(θˆ,x∗D)
∂x∗D
> 0, and rewriting
dθˆ(x∗D)
dx∗D
=
Q
Q− a√
bc
φˆ(B(θˆ))P2 + 1
,
it is easy to check that
dθˆ(x∗D)
dx∗D
<
b
a+ b
holds whenever a <
√
2pib(1+c)
1+
√
1+c
. Since this implies that a <
√
2pib(1 + c), the proof
is complete. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
Using Lemma 2 and equation (10), we can write s∗D = θ
∗
D(x
∗
D) + M , where M =
Φ−1(κ2)√
a+b+bc
. Thus, the creditors’ cutoff condition in t1 can be expressed purely in terms
of x∗D:
κ1 = Pr(si < θ
∗
D(x
∗
D) +M |x∗D)κ2 + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D(x∗D), si ≥ θ∗D(x∗D) +M |x∗D)
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Write x for x∗D and let
G(x) = Pr(si < θ
∗
D(x) +M |x)κ2 + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D(x), si ≥ θ∗D(x) +M |x)− κ1.
Note that
Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D(x)|x) = 1− Φ
(√
a+ b
(
θ∗D(x)−
aµ+ bx
a+ b
))
.
Define A(x) as
A(x) =
√
a+ b
(
θ∗D(x)−
aµ+ bx
a+ b
)
and note that, given x,
si =
aµ+ bx+ bcθ +
√
bcηi
a+ b+ bc
.
Rearranging terms, this can be rewritten as
si =
aµ+ bx
a+ b
+
bc
a+ b+ bc
[
z√
a+ b
+
ηi√
bc
]
,
where z =
√
a+ b
(
θ − aµ+bx
a+b
)
is distributed N(0, 1) conditional on x. Let γ =
z√
a+b
+ ηi√
bc
. Then, si < θ
∗
D(x) +M is equivalent to
γ <
a+ b+ bc
bc
√
a+ b
A(x) +
√
a+ b+ bc
bc
Φ−1(κ2).
Now let
B(x) =
a+ b+ bc
bc
√
a+ b
A(x) +
√
a+ b+ bc
bc
Φ−1(κ2)
and rewrite
G(x) =Pr(γ < B(x))κ2 + Pr(z ≥ A(x), γ ≥ B(x))− κ1
=Pr(z < A(x), γ < B(x))κ2 + Pr(z ≥ A(x), γ < B(x))κ2
+ Pr(z ≥ A(x), γ ≥ B(x))− κ1. (18)
Differentiating under the double integral and rearranging, we get:
G′(x) = B′(x)φˆ(B(x))[κ2 − P2]− A′(x)φ(A(x))P1,
where P1 and P2 are defined as follows:
P1 =
∫ ∞
B(x)
f(γ|z = A(x))dγ
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P2 =
∫ ∞
A(x)
f(z|γ = B(x))dz.
Using standard computations to derive conditional distributions of normal random
variables (see e.g. Mittelhammer (1996)), we know that:
z|γ = B(x) ∼ N
(
A(x) +
√
a+ b√
a+ b+ bc
Φ−1(κ2),
a+ b
a+ b+ bc
)
.
Thus,
P2 =
∫ ∞
A(x)
f(z|γ = B(x))dz = κ2,
and therefore G′(x) reduces to
G′(x) = −A′(x)φ(A(x))P1.
Under the conditions of the theorem, Lemma 2 states that dθˆ(x)
dx
< b
a+b
. Thus,
A′(x) < 0, implying that G′(x) > 0. Moreover, note that limx→−∞G(x) = κ2 − κ1
< 0 and limx→∞G(x) = 1−κ1 > 0. Hence, there exists a unique solution (x∗D, s∗D, θ∗D)
to the three necessary conditions (8) to (10) for an equilibrium in trigger strategies.
Finally, fixing θ∗D, the indifference condition for creditors in t1 as given by (18)
depends on x only via the functions A(x) =
√
a+ b
(
θ∗D − aµ+bxa+b
)
and B(x) =
a+b+bc
bc
√
a+b
A(x) +
√
a+b+bc
bc
Φ−1(κ2). If θ∗D is fixed, A(x, θ
∗
D) clearly is strictly decreasing
in x for all b > 0, so that creditors who receive signals x < x∗D choose to foreclose in
t1, and they choose to delay the foreclosure decision whenever x ≥ x∗D. Therefore,
the proof is complete. 
A.4. Formal derivation of equations (11) and (12)
First consider the derivation of equation (11). Applying Lebesgue’s theorem of
dominated convergence, we can write:
Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ∗D) =
∫ ∞
x∗D
Pr(si < s
∗
D|θ∗D, xi)f(xi|θ∗D)dxi.
By definition si =
aµ+bxi+
√
bcyi+bcx
∗
D
a+b+bc
. Given xi and θ
∗
D, and substituting
yi =
√
b(θ∗D − x∗D) + ηi√c , this transforms to si =
aµ+bxi+bcθ
∗
D+
√
bcηi
a+b+bc
. Using equation
(10), si < s
∗
D then implies that
ηi <
a+ b√
bc
θ∗D +
√
a+ b+ bc
bc
Φ−1(κ2)− a√
bc
µ−
√
b
c
xi.
21
As c→∞, the right-hand side converges pointwise to Φ−1(κ2) and therefore
Pr(si < s
∗
D|θ∗D, xi)→ Φ
(
Φ−1(κ2)
)
= κ2.
Thus,
Pr(xi ≥ x∗D, si < s∗D|θ∗D)→ Pr(xi ≥ x∗D|θ∗D)κ2 = Φ
(√
b(θ∗D − x∗D)
)
κ2,
implying that equation (8) reduces to
θ∗D = 1− Φ
(√
b(θ∗D − x∗D)
)
+ Φ
(√
b(θ∗D − x∗D)
)
κ2.
Rearranging terms, we finally get
1− θ∗D = (1− κ2) Φ
(√
b(θ∗D − x∗D)
)
.
Now, consider the derivation of equation (12). By Lebesgue dominated convergence,
Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D, si ≥ θ∗D|x∗D) =
∫ ∞
θ∗D
Pr(si ≥ s∗D|θ, x∗D)f(θ|x∗D)dθ.
Given x∗D and θ, it is easy to see that si =
aµ+bxi+bcθ+
√
bcηi
a+b+bc
. Thus,
si ≥ s∗D ⇔
aµ+ bxi + bcθ +
√
bcηi
a+ b+ bc
≥ θ∗D +
1√
a+ b+ bc
Φ−1(κ2),
which reduces to
ηi ≥
√
bc(θ∗D − θ) +
a+ b√
bc
θ∗D +
√
a+ b+ bc
bc
Φ−1(κ2)− a√
bc
µ− b√
bc
xi.
As c→∞, the right-hand side of this inequality tends to −∞ if θ > θ∗D, and to ∞
if θ < θ∗D. Hence,
Pr(si ≥ s∗D|x∗D)→
1 if θ > θ∗D0 if θ < θ∗D.
Thus,
Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D, si ≥ s∗D|x∗D)→ Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D|x∗D).
This implies that equation (9) reduces to κ1 = Pr(θ < θ
∗
D|x∗D)κ2 + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗D|x∗D),
or in other words,
1− κ1 = (1− κ2)Φ
(√
a+ b
(
θ∗D −
aµ+ bx∗D
a+ b
))
.

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